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“DEPENDENT CONTRACTORS” IN THE GIG ECONOMY:
A COMPARATIVE APPROACH

Miriam A. Cherry & Antonio Aloisi*
In response to worker misclassification lawsuits in the United
States, there have been recent calls for the creation of a hybrid category in
between employee and independent contractor specifically for the gig
economy. However, such an intermediate category is not new. In fact, the
intermediate category has existed in many countries for decades, producing
successful results in some, and misadventure in others. In this article, we
use a comparative approach to analyze the experiences of Canada, Italy,
and Spain with the intermediate category. In our analysis we focus on a set
of questions: Is labour law fundamentally outdated for the digital age?
Does the gig economy need its own specialized set of rules, and what should
they look like? What role does digitalization and technology play in the
casualization of work? We ultimately conclude that workable proposals for
a third category must also encompass other forms of precarious
employment.
Recently there have been a spate of lawsuits across the United States
alleging that platforms in the “on demand” economy have misclassified
their workers as independent contractors.1 In response to the litigation and
widespread confusion about how these workers should be classified, there
have been proposals for a “third” or “hybrid” category to be created in the
United States, situated between the categories of “employee” and
“independent contractor.” Regardless of whether these workers would be
denominated “dependent contractors,” or “independent workers,” these
proposals for establishing a hybrid category have sparked debate and
controversy.2 Proponents advocate that an intermediate category is
necessary for the modern economic and technological realities of the gig
*
Miriam A. Cherry, Professor of Law, Director of the William C. Wefel Center of Employment Law, Saint
Louis University Law School; J.D., 1999, Harvard Law School, B.A., 1996, Dartmouth College; Antonio Aloisi,
Visiting Researcher, Saint Louis University Law School; PhD candidate, Luigi Bocconi University, Milan. The
authors wish to thank the administration at both Saint Louis University and Bocconi University for facilitating this
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University. We also wish to thank William (Bill) Johnson, the Director of Saint Louis University’s Center for
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1
For a listing of the ongoing litigation surrounding the on-demand economy, see Miriam A. Cherry, Beyond
Misclassification: The Digital Transformation of Work, 37 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 577, 584-85 (2016).
2
See Section III, infra.
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economy. They also suggest that a third category is a novel innovation,
appropriately crafted for the era of digital platform work.3
In fact, the intermediate category between employee and
independent contractor is not new. Many foreign legal systems have
already had decades of experience with implementing an intermediate
category.4 In this paper we employ a comparative approach, and examine
the laws of three countries that have such experiences with a third category:
Canada, Italy, and Spain.5 These legal systems have had varying success, in
some instances, or misadventure, in others.6 Before reflexively launching a
hybrid category only for platform work in the U.S, we should seek to
understand evaluate the experiences of other nations in their implementation
of the intermediate category.
Classification as an employee is an important practical question.
Classification is a “gateway” to determine who deserves the protections of
labor and employment laws, including the right to organize, minimum
wage, and unemployment compensation, to name just a few of the benefits
that are part and parcel of employee status.7 As such, classification as an
employee is actually “an important instrument for the delivery of workers’
rights.”8 Further, it is important to note that lessons we can draw from the
on demand economy are not specific only to platforms or gig jobs.
Increasingly, work in the modern economy is becoming casualized,
outsourced, and broken apart.9 Workers are being managed by and through
data, often through algorithms, and even without a platform many sectors
are seeing the rise of the just-in-time workforce.10 Rather than create a
3

2016.

4

See, e.g. Vin Guerrieri, Uber Cases Could Spur New Employee Classification, LAW360 BLOG, May 6,

Valerio De Stefano, ILO Report on Classification. [source to be inserted].
We chose Canada, Italy, and Spain for this comparative study in particular because these countries
illustrated a broad array of experiences with the third category. In addition, we are aware of a comparative study
that is in progress to examine the German and the Japanese experiences, and so further examination of those two
nations will be forthcoming. Germany is an intriguing example because of the presence of a category that applies
to “worker-like persons.” See Wolfgang Daubler, Working People in Germany, 21 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 77
(1999-2000); Ryuichi Yamakawa, New Wine in Old Bottles: Employee/Independent Contractor Distinction under
Japanese Labor Law, 21 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 99 (1999-2000). We are also aware that the third category’s
historical origins are somewhat apocryphal. In the 1960s when Canada was contemplating a third category, they
referenced Sweden. Modern day Sweden’s legal landscape is described in Kent Kallstrom, Employment and
Contract Work, 21 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 157 (1999-2000). In any event, the third category is well-known in
jurisdictions outside the United States.
6
The categories in these legal systems were formulated before the on-demand economy existed, but they did
try to address other forms of non-standard or contingent work. For example, in Canada, the third category
developed in response to a perceived problem with small tradespeople who were nominally self-employed but
who were for all intents and purposes economically dependent on one large customer. See Section IV, infra.
7
Matthew W. Finkin, Beclouded Work, Beclouded Worker in Historical Perspective, 37 COMP. LAB. L. &
POL’Y J. 603 (2016), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2712722.
8
Guy Davidov, The Three Axes of Employment Relationships: A Characterization of Workers in Need of
Protection, 52 U. TORONTO L. J.. 357 (2002), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=555998
9
See generally DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE (2014). See also JUDY FUDGE, Fragmenting Work
and Fragmenting Organizations: The Contract of Employment and the Scope of Labour Regulation. OSGOODE
HALL LAW JOURNAL, Vol. 44, No. 4, (2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=974916
10
Cherry, supra note 1 at 596-97.
5
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special classification category only for the gig economy, we keep in mind
the idea that any proposal for a new category would ideally be formulated to
ameliorate conditions for other forms of precarious work and fissured
workplaces.
This paper will proceed by first providing a brief context on
crowdwork and the gig economy. The next section will summarize the
current proposals for an intermediate category for the gig economy in the
United States. The next section describes the legal systems of Canada,
Italy, and Spain, and their experiences with implementation of the third
category. Canada’s implementation was perhaps the most successful,
focusing on expanding the coverage of laws aimed at “employees” to
encompass vulnerable small business and tradespeople. Italy, on the other
hand, saw systemic arbitrage between the standard employment category
and the intermediate category. The result was confusion and a movement to
strip workers of their rights by misclassifying them downwards. Spain, on
the other hand, revised its laws fairly recently, but because of burdensome
requirements and a seventy-five percent dependency threshold to enter the
third category, the category has failed to catch on, covering only a tiny
portion of Spanish workers.
Informed by these experiences, the last section provides a detailed
analysis of the larger implications of the three national case studies for
labour law. These policy suggestions are guided by two overarching
values: fairness for workers and safe harbors for platforms that are truly
engaging in volunteerism-based work, community-organized business
models, or only de minimis engagement with the paid labor force. For the
first value of worker protection, we must be cognizant of how establishing a
third category could result in increasing arbitrage between the categories.
In the Italian case, some workers actually happened to lose protections as
businesses took advantage of the legal confusion engendered by the creation
of an intermediate category.
The default rule, we propose, should be employee status, or
something that, at the very least, resembles it closely. Numerous ondemand companies are already moving in this direction because they would
like the ability to control, train, and maintain a stable workforce, which are
hallmarks of the employment relationship. At the same time, we readily
acknowledge that there are parts of the on-demand economy that are not
about labour relations or potential exploitation of workers; rather, they are
about communities, genuine sharing, and innovation. Any reform to
address labour issues for platforms should include safe harbors for people
who are genuinely sharing in such a way that paid work is secondary or
tertiary to their goals. In our proposal the threshold would be low and a
way of separating one-off transactions or volunteerism from various forms
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of employment. The balancing of these interests will further worker
protection and coverage of those who are using platforms as equivalent to
professional employment, while exempting those who are using these
platforms to create community or to volunteer.
II.
A.

THE CONTEXT OF CROWDWORK
The Scope of the On-Demand Economy

Technology is increasingly changing the efficiencies and modalities
of work.11 In an earlier article one of the authors referred to this trend as
“virtual work,”12 and it has been also been described as “labor as a service,”
“peer production,” “playbor,” or “crowdwork.”13 Some processes of
“crowdwork” or “micro-labor” involve computer-based work that is
performed wholly in cyberspace, where work is broken down into its
smallest constituent parts (such as coding, describing, or tagging the
thousands of items for sale on a website).14 Other types of crowdwork are
aided by cellphone applications (“apps”) or websites, and they rely on
technology to deploy workers to perform tasks (such as driving, grocery
delivery, or home repair services) for requesters in the real world who pay
for these services, with the app or platform keeping a percentage of the
exchange.
According to a recent survey conducted by Time Magazine, over 14
million people currently work in the “gig,” “on demand,” “platform,” or
11
This section is a broad review of the legal landscape of the on demand economy. As much of it has been
covered elsewhere, we will be correspondingly brief. We have largely adapted this section from both of the
authors’ earlier work that described the particular features, structures, economics, and legal issues of the gig
economy. See Cherry, supra note 1; Antonio Aloisi, Commoditized Workers, 37 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 653
(2016). For additional background information on the gig economy, see Valerio De Stefano, The Rise of the
“Just-in-Time Workforce”: On Demand Work, Crowd Work and Labour Protection in the “Gig-Economy,” 37
COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 471 (2016); Benjamin Means & Joseph A. Seiner, Navigating the Uber Economy, 49
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1511 (2016); Brishen Rodgers, The Social Costs of Uber, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 85 (2015); Orly
Lobel, The Law of the Platform, __ MINN. L. REV. ___ (forthcoming, 2016), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2742380;
12
Miriam A. Cherry, A Taxonomy of Virtual Work, 45 GA. L. REV. 951 (2011) (using term “virtual work”
broadly not only to encompass virtual worlds but also to refer to work taking place online, including the type of
micro-labor crowdwork performed on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk).
13
See Trebor Scholz & Laura Liu, From Mobile Playgrounds to Sweatshop City, SITUATED TECHNOLOGIES
PAMPHLETS 7 (2010), http://www.situatedtechnologies.net/?q=node/105.
14
See, e.g. Jeff Howe, The Rise of Crowdsourcing, WIRED, June 2006, at 176, 178-79 (using term
“crowdsourcing” to describe work performed with the aid of contributions from diverse groups of users on the
internet); Deborah Halbert, Mass Culture and the Culture of the Masses, A Manifesto for User-Generated Rights,
11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 921, 929 (2009) (“Computer technology in the hands of the masses has made
available software programs that can create music, documents, and art just as well as expensive studios did in the
past. This democratization of technology disrupts the monopoly on the creative means of production. The world of
amateur production also demonstrates that many are motivated by noncommercial reasons.”). See also IRENE
MANDL, Working conditions in crowd employment and ICT-based mobile work, The Digital Economy and the

Single Market, Foundation for
europe.eu/en/publications/details/417

European Progressive Studies, available at http://www.feps-
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“sharing” economy.15 While these statistics have been the subject of
controversy,16 there can be no doubt that technology is re-shaping the future
of work. Examples include websites and apps that range from Amazon
Mechanical Turk,17 Handy,18 Instacart,19 to Uber.20 These new companies’
labor practices have sparked intense litigation in the United States.
Currently, these litigations are focusing on a common doctrinal issue –
whether the workers in the on-demand economy have the status of
employees or independent contractors. The question of employee status is
particularly important because it is a threshold question to determine the
rights and benefits owed in U.S. employment law. Important substantive
rights, including minimum wage, protection from discrimination,
unemployment insurance, worker’s compensation to name a few, are only
triggered for those workers who are deemed to be “employees.”
B.

Legal Standards for Determining Worker Status

Under U.S. law, whether a worker is an employee or independent
contractor is determined through various multi-factored tests dependent on
the facts of the relationship.21 The “control” test derives from the caselaw
and decisions on agency law, and focuses on a principal’s right to control
the worker. In brief we will suffice to say that some of the factors for
finding employee status are whether the employer may direct the way in
which the work is performed, determine the hours involved, and provide the
employee with direction.22 On the other hand, elements that lean toward
independent contractor classification include high-skilled work, workers
15
Katy Steinmetz, Exclusive: See How Big the Gig Economy Really Is, TIME, Jan. 6, 2016 available at
http://time.com/4169532/sharing-economy-poll/
16
Cole Stangler, December Jobs Report: How Many Gig Economy Workers are There, Really?, INT’L BUS.
TIMES, Jan. 8, 2016, available at http://www.ibtimes.com/december-jobs-report-how-many-gig-economyworkers-are-there-really-2255765. In the article, prominent economists Alan Kreuger and Larry Mishel both
quibble with the numbers in the Time survey, supra note 15, arguing that the numbers of on-demand economy
workers are far lower. What is interesting is that both economists have ideological reasons for minimizing the
number of workers. If the number of workers in the on-demand economy is small, that supports the argument that
there is no need for regulation, a notion that Kreuger, who once consulted for Uber, could get behind. The reason
for Mishel’s minimization of the on demand economy is cloudy, but it may have to do with the idea that labor
unions should continue to appeal to their traditional base and ignore technological change. Lawrence Mishel,
Uber is Not the Future of Work, THE ATLANTIC, Nov. 16, 2015. Regardless of whose numbers we believe, or
what conclusions we are to draw from them, the fact is that these estimates and analyses are subject to debate and
controversy.
17
AMAZON MECHANICAL TURK, https://www.mturk.com/mturk/welcome.
18
HANDY, http://www.handy.com/.
19
INSTACART, https://www.instacart.com/.
20
UBER, www.uber.com.
21
See Katharine V.W. Stone, Legal Protections for Atypical Employees: Employment Law for Workers
without Workplaces and and Employees without Employers, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 251, 257-58 (2006)
(listing factors from the cases). Oft-cited cases on this subject include Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331
U.S. 722, 728-29 (1947); Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. U.S., 398 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1968); Nationwide Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 326 (1992).
22
See, e.g. Herman v. Express Sixty-Minutes Delivery Service, Inc., 161 F.3d 299 (5th Cir. 1998).

6

Cherry & Aloisi

[22-Oct-16

providing their own equipment, workers setting their own schedules, and
getting paid per project, not per hour.23 In an alternate test, courts examine
the economic realities of the relationship to determine whether the worker is
exhibiting entrepreneurial activity, or whether the worker is financially
dependent upon the employer.24 The label affixed to the relationship is a
factor in the outcome, but it is certainly not dispositive. In any event, the
tests are notoriously malleable, difficult, and fact-dependent, even when
dealing with what should be a fairly straightforward analysis.25
C.

The Uber Litigation and Settlement

Many commentators had hoped these disputes over worker
classification would be concluded, or at least be shaped, by the wage and
hour lawsuits within platform companies that have been pending in the
Northern District of California.26 In the largest of these suits, O’Connor v.
Uber, 27 over 400,000 drivers for the popular ridesharing service were
certified as a class to seek employee status and redress under the FLSA for
minimum wages and overtime pay. In May 2016, however, O’Connor v.
Uber settled for a $100 million payment to the workers and an agreement
that workers would receive a hearing before an arbitrator before dismissal.28
While this was a brokered compromise, the settlement failed to bring about
any definitive resolution to the classification problem.29 As of the present
writing, the court had rejected the settlement as inadequate, and the parties
23
See, e.g. Richard R. Carlson, Variations on A Theme of Employment: Labor Law Regulation of Alternative
Worker Relations, 37 S. TEX. L. REV. 661, 663 (1996) (“Most labor and employment laws assume a paradigmatic
relationship between an “employer” and “employee.” The employer in this model contracts directly with an
individual employee to perform an indefinite series or duration of tasks, subject to the employer's actual or
potential supervision over the employee's method, manner, time and place of performance. This model describes
most workers well enough, but there has always been a large pool of workers in alternative relationships with
recipients of services. Some workers are “independent contractors” who contract to perform specific tasks or
achieve particular results, but who retain independence and self-management over their performance.”).
24
Stone, supra note 21 at 257-58.
25
Richard R. Carlson, Why the Law Still Can't Tell an Employee When It Sees One and How It Ought to
Stop Trying, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 295, 298 (2001) (“Indeed, in the case of employee status, the law
encourages ambiguity. On the one hand, employers often crave the control they enjoy in a normal employment
relationship. On the other, the advantages (to employers) of employing workers who are plausibly not employees
motivate a good deal of arbitrary and questionable “non-employee” classification. It is not uncommon to find
employees and putative contractors sitting side by side, performing the same work without any immediately
visible distinguishing characteristics.13 And the trend of the working world is toward greater complexity and
variation, driven partly by the temptation to capitalize on the fog that obscures the essence of many working
relationships.”)
26
See Cherry, supra note 1 at 584-85.
27
O’Connor v. Uber, 3:13-cv-03826-EMC (N.D. Cal.).
28
Having the claims for dismissal heard by an arbitrator was actually an important aspect of the settlement.
Many Uber drivers had complained that they would find themselves disconnected from the platform because of a
complaint or because their customer ratings had dropped below a certain threshold. Many felt that these
dismissals were arbitrary and particularly cruel because of their automated nature. Alex Rosenblat & Luke Stark,
Uber’s Drivers: Information Asymmetries and Control in Dynamic Work, available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2686227.
29
Miriam A. Cherry, Gig Economy: Settlement Leaves Legal Issues Unsettled, LAW 360 BLOG, May 5,
2016, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2776213.
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are continuing to negotiate.30 [This section will be updated as events
unfold].
Throughout the litigation, the judges in the Northern District of
California struggled to characterize these working relationships within the
“on/off” toggle of employee status.31 As some have noted, with Uber some
of the factors in the control test point toward an employee relationship
while others are reminiscent of an independent contractor relationship.32
On the one hand, crowdworkers have some flexibility to set their own
schedules and can sign on and off the app more readily than do real workers
in a traditional environment who work a set shift or who are otherwise
tethered to a workplace desk or factory floor. Crowdworkers also use their
own cellular telephones, computer equipment, Internet connections, and
other tools.
Further, EULAs label crowdworkers as “independent
contractors” and force them to click “I agree” in order to proceed with
work.
On the other hand, many factors lean toward an employment
relationship. Control may be high, given that companies like Uber use
customer ratings to maintain almost a constant surveillance over workers.
Uber has essentially deputized its customers to manage the workforce and
make detailed reports on how service is provided.33 In fact, many ondemand companies spend a great deal of time and effort to implement
quality control policies. With low-skilled crowdwork, the opportunity for
entrepreneurship, and with it risk-and-reward, is barely, if at all, present.
Further, the terminology in a EULA is far from dispositive, as such online
contracts are known to be extremely one-sided and are construed against the
drafter. The possibility for exploitation is high, and low-skilled workers are
those that are most in need of FLSA protection.
All of this left the judges in the Northern District of California with
a malleable test and an indeterminate legal outcome.34 With the uncertainty
of the jury looming, both sides in Cotter v. Lyft and O’Connor v. Uber
would be taking a significant risk by proceeding with a trial. Given the
incentive structure of settlements and payments to plaintiffs’ class action
attorneys, and the presence of arbitration clauses in the EULAs, perhaps
30
Jon Weinberg, Gig News: Federal Judge Rejects Uber Settlement, On Labor, available at
https://onlabor.org/2016/09/08/gig-news-federal-judge-rejects-uber-settlement/
31
Again, this has been a longstanding problem. See, e.g. Alan Hyde, Employment Law After the Death of
Employment, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 99, 101 (1998) (“The new ways of working, that I believe challenge
normal legal analyses, include such new relations of employment as temporary employment placed by an agency
and part-time employment rendered by people who have no other employer but are treated as contingent workers
without benefits or implicit promises. They also include ways of working that are not, technically, “employment”
relations under any statute: independent contractors, free-lancers, consultants, and people out of the labor market
after downsizing or other elimination of former career jobs.”).
32
Means & Seiner, supra note 11 at 1516-17; Rodgers, supra note 11 at 98-99.
33
Rosenblat & Stark, supra note 28 at 11-12.
34
Cotter v. Lyft, 60 F. Supp. 3d 1069, 1081-82 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
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settlement in these cases was inevitable.35 The drivers, however, stood only
to recover small or nominal payments, which led the court to reject that
version of a compromise. While we will have to wait and see what the
parties and the court will decide, what is certain is that the initial question of
whether the workers are misclassified as independent contractors is as of yet
left unresolved. Notwithstanding the settlement, a government agency like
the Internal Revenue Service, a worker’s compensation board, or an
unemployment agency could determine that these workers are actually
employees; in fact, some already have.36
III.

RECENT PROPOSALS FOR A THIRD CATEGORY
FOCUSED ON THE GIG ECONOMY

As litigation over worker misclassification lawsuits continues in
various U.S. jurisdictions, there have been corresponding calls to create a
hybrid category situated in between employee and independent contractor
status. If such a third category were to exist, proponents argue that the
dilemmas surrounding proper worker classification would conveniently
disappear. Having an intermediate category for gig workers would provide
certainty and stability to businesses implementing a crowdsourcing model.
Proponents claim that the third category would have advantages for gig
workers as well, who would at least attain some portion of the benefits that
accrue to employees. These proposals all seem to be focused on the gig
economy and creating a special “carve out.” Proponents cite innovation and
the novelty of these forms of work and organization as a reason for special
treatment. The argument is that innovative business models cannot survive
if overly regulated.37 Many of the calls for a third category originated in
Silicon Valley and these proposals create a third category that, while called
something different, virtually mirror independent contractors.38
Intuitively appealing, a third category would resolve many of the
ongoing disputes over misclassification plaguing the on-demand sector.
Rather than litigate the issue of whether a particular worker or group of
workers deserve employee status, gig workers would automatically be
35
On the role of arbitration clauses in the O’Connor v. Uber settlement, see Katherine V.W. Stone, The
Uber Litigation Shows How the Company Gets Around Employment Laws, ALTERNET.COM (May 24, 2016),
http://www.alternet.org/labor/uber-litigation-shows-how-company-gets-around-employment-laws.
36
Uber Techs. v. Berwick¸ No. CGC-15-546378, LEXIS 9488, at *1-2 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 21, 2015); Mike
Isaac & Natasha Singer, California Says Uber Driver Is Employee, Not a Contractor, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2015
at B1.
37
Note that this trope is certainly not limited to technology businesses in Silicon Valley or recent events in
the gig economy; businesses for years have criticized regulations bureaucracy for stifling innovation.
38 “At a recent on-demand economy event, Simon Rothman, a venture capitalist and advisor to companies
like Lyft and Taskrabbit, said, “I think it’s not 1099 versus W-2. I think the right answer is a third class of
worker.” Caroline Donovan, What a New Class of Worker Could Mean for the Future of Labor, BUZZFEED
NEWS, June 18, 2015, available at https://www.buzzfeed.com/carolineodonovan/meet-the-new-worker-same-asthe-old-worker?utm_term=.uipR68pav#.qe99zxMmQ
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sorted into the hybrid “dependent contractor” category. This would
eliminate the uncertainty that goes along with litigation connected to the
“all or nothing” scheme and, at least, offer some labor protection to workers
who “present only some characteristics of ‘employees’ but not others.”39
Media stories and blog posts have debated the third category and its
possibilities. For example, a news story in the Wall Street Journal
discussed the advantages of creating a new third category.40 A writer for
the Washington Post also discussed the possibility of a third category, but
ended critically, noting that gig workers were unlikely to receive the
protection they needed through an intermediate category. Likewise,
Professor Benjamin Sachs has authored a series of blog posts debating the
merits of creating a third category, and has approached the concept with
some skepticism.41
Recently, two more in-depth studies appeared that have called for
the creation of a third category. The first was a report sponsored by the
Hamilton Project, a subsidiary of the Brookings Institute.42 Written by
former Deputy Secretary of Labor Seth Harris and Princeton economist
Alan Krueger,43 the report advocates the creation of a hybrid category as a
default for gig workers. The proposal terms this category, neutrally if
perhaps confusingly, “independent worker.” 44 All gig economy workers
would default into this “independent worker” status.45 Interestingly, while
arguing that weak independent workers deserve better benefits and
protections, the Hamilton project report asserts that the platforms could not
be considered employers, and neither could the customers, as they are in a
triangular relationship. 46 Paradoxically that leads to the logical conclusion
39
Guy Davidov et al, The Subjects of Labor Law: 'Employees' and Other Workers, forthcoming in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK IN COMPARATIVE LABOR LAW (Matthew Finkin & Guy Mundlak Eds. Edward Elgar
2015), Hebrew University of Jerusalem Legal Research Paper No. 15-15, available at
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/asbstract=2561752
40
Lauren Weber, What if there were a New Type of Worker? Dependent Contractor, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28,
2015, available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/what-if-there-were-a-new-type-of-worker-dependent-contractor1422405831.
41
Benjamin Sachs, A New Category of Worker for the On-Demand Economy, June 22, 2015, ON LABOR,
available at https://onlabor.org/2015/06/22/a-new-category-of-worker-for-the-on-demand-economy/; Benjamin
Sachs, Do We Need an “Independent Worker” Category, ON LABOR, Dec. 8, 2015, available at
https://onlabor.org/2015/12/08/do-we-need-an-independent-worker-category/.
42 Seth D. Harris & Alan B. Krueger, A Proposal for Modernizing Labor Laws for Twenty-First-Century
Work: The “Independent Worker,” THE HAMILTON PROJECT, available at
http://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/modernizing_labor_laws_for_twenty_first_century_work_krueger_ha
rris.pdf.
43 Krueger carried out this study independently, but - in the past - co-edited a study commissioned by Uber.
See Jonathon Hall & Alan Krueger, An Analysis of the Labor Market for Uber’s Driver-Partners in the United
States, available at https://s3.amazonaws.com/uber-static/comms/PDF/Uber_DriverPartners_Hall_Kreuger_2015.pdf
44 Harris & Krueger, supra note 41 at 2.
45 Id.
46 Conversely, according to the District Court, do not only provide an intermediary platform for drivers and
clients to use: quoting the relevant decisions, Uber “does not simply sell software; it sells rides” and Lyft “markets
itself to costumer as an on-demand ride service, and it actively seeks out those customers”. Lyft provides drivers
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that there is no employer present whatsoever, a proposition which other
authors have strongly disputed.47
Under the Hamilton project proposal, such “independent workers”
would gain rights to organize and bargain collectively under the NLRA and
would also gain anti-discrimination protections under Title VII.48 However,
the Hamilton project proposal excludes payment for overtime and minimum
wage arrangements, since – at least according to Harris and Kreuger – the
gig economy business model does not allow anyone for tracing hours in a
precise way or even for attribution of hours to any particular platform.
Further, the Hamilton project claims that an hours-based rate of pay does
not make sense when dealing with work that is paid by the gig. This stance
has been criticized for ignoring the role of big data in the on demand
economy.49 If anything, there is constant tracking of data of workers in the
gig economy that allows for far better calculations of time and work
performed than any previous form of work ever could.50
The second proposal, from business law professor Abbey Stemler,
will appear in the Fordham Urban Law Journal.51 Titled “Betwixt and
Between: Regulating the Shared Economy,” Stemler advocates the creation
of new legislation to address multiple aspects of the on-demand economy,
including fraud, safety, and privacy. In terms of labor rights, Stemler
advocates creating a hybrid category between employee and independent
contractor. As she puts it, “[i]nstead of classifying Uber drivers and other
supply-side users in the sharing economy as either employees or
independent contractors, regulators should create a new classification. This
new classification has been identified as “dependent contractors,” or for the
purposes of this Article “microbusiness” – workers who fall between clearcut employees and traditional independent contractors.
This new
classification would enable regulators to think differently about how to fill
regulatory gaps.”52 While a footnote references the Canadian experience
with dependent contractors, this is only a passing reference. No background
or in-depth discussion is devoted to the historical or international origins of
the category.
On the political front, Senator Mark Warren of Virginia has recently
with “detailed instruction on how to conduct themselves” whilst “Uber would not be a viable business entity
without its drivers”.
47
See Jeremias Prassl & Martin Risak, Who is the Employer?, 37 J. COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y 619, 620
(2016).
48
Harris & Krueger, supra note 41 at 17-18.
49 Ross Eisenbrey & Lawrence Mishel, Uber business model does not justify a new ‘independent worker’
category, Economic Policy Institute (Mar. 17, 2016), available at http://www.epi.org/publication/uber-businessmodel-does-not-justify-a-new-independent-worker-category.
50 Matthew Bodie et al, The Law and Policy of People Analytics, __ COLO. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2017).
51
Abbey Stemler, Betwixt and Between: Regulating the Shared Economy, __ FORDHAM URB. L. J. __
(forthcoming 2016).
52
Id. at 30-31.
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begun discussing the need for legislation to address some of the issues
surrounding gig-work.53 A recent message from his office noted that many
younger Americans were finding themselves working at multiple gigs
without benefits. This type of arrangement is reasonable when all goes
well, but if there is a problem and no health benefits, unemployment, or
worker’s compensation, many workers could find themselves without a
safety net. As the statement continued it noted that “while litigation is
underway about whether on-demand workers are independent contractors or
employees, this question is too important to leave to the courts alone. As
policymakers, we should begin discussing whether our 20th-century
definitions work in a 21st-century economy.”54 In other words, regardless of
how the doctrinal legal questions around worker misclassification are
worked out within the court system, Senator Warren proposes that the
problems of the gig economy might be better addressed through legislative
action.
IV.

A COMPARATIVE APPROACH

To date, the recent calls to establish a third category of “dependent
contractor” have focused only on the present state of the gig economy.
Likewise, these calls have been centered almost wholly on the United
States, where many popular crowdwork services were created. Situating the
“dependent contractor” category within an historical and global context,
however, we note that other countries have already experimented with an
intermediate category, with various and mixed results. Granted, these legal
reform efforts pre-dated the platform economy, but these approaches arose
in response to a perceived lack of coverage by the binary switch that is the
hallmark of the worker misclassification issue. In this section, we
undertake comparisons of the experiences of Canada, Italy, and Spain, in
that order. Our goal is to learn from context and experience, so that we can
capitalize on those elements of the third category that were successful, and
to avoid the aspects of those systems that worked poorly. We will begin
with the Canadian experience.
A. The Canadian Experience:
Professor Harry Arthurs and “Dependent Contractors”
Historically, Canadian law used the term “employee” as a gateway
53
Mark Warner, Asking Tough Questions About the Gig Economy, MARK R. WARNER (June 19, 2015),
http://www.warner.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/newsclips?ContentRecord_id=9ec95aab-a96c-4dd5-8532b45667013d2e.
54
Id.
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to coverage, employing the binary employee / independent contractor
distinction. As most statutory definitions of “employee” in Canadian
statutes were circular and unhelpful, the starting point for most analyses
was the control test that had evolved under the principle of vicarious
liability for torts. In 1947, the traditional control test used in Canada was
supplemented with a “fourfold” test that was explained in the well-known
case Montreal v. Montreal Locomotive Works, including “(1) control; (2)
ownership of the tools; (3) chance of profit; (4) risk of loss.”55 As one
commentator has put it, these are “merely different ways of expressing the
same ultimate question of ‘whose business is it?”56 and they bear a
similarity to the “entrepreneurial activities test” that has been developed in
the United States.
The doctrine around employee status took an interesting turn with
the Canadian adoption of the concept of “dependent contractor.” The
development of the category is largely due to the efforts of one law
professor, Harry Arthurs. Professor Arthurs, widely credited as one of the
leading academics of Canadian labor law, wrote about the problem of
misclassification in a now-classic 1965 law review article.57 The third
category was certainly not Arthurs’ invention out of whole cloth, however.
Indeed, he claimed to have come across the idea of another category while
studying Swedish labor law.58 Regardless of its provenance, Arthurs seized
on the idea of a third category of “dependent contractors” as a reaction to a
trend he was seeing increasingly in the labor markets that created injustice
for certain groups of Canadian workers.
Professor Arthurs’ article noted that small tradespeople, artisans,
plumbers, craftsmen, and the like were increasingly structuring themselves
as separate business entities.59 Yet, despite setting up shop as separate
companies, and thus falling outside the traditional purview of “employees,”
these tradespeople had no other employees but the one worker-owner.
Further, these tradespeople would work effectively full-time for one
company that effectively paid them a retainer for all of their services and
time. As a matter of economic reality, Arthurs noted that these putative
55

Montreal v. Montreal Locomotive Works, [1947] 1 D.L.R. 161, 169.
See Brian A. Langille & Guy Davidov, Beyond Employees and Independent Contractors, 21 COMP. LAB.
L. & POL’Y J. 7. 21 (1999-2000); see also 671122 Ontario Ltd. V. Sagaz Industries Canada, 2001 SCC 59. See
also Judy Fudge, Eric Tucker and Leah Vosko, Employee or Independent Contractor? Charting the Legal
Significance of the Distinction in Canada (July 22, 2011). Canadian Labour and Employment Law Journal, Vol.
10, No. 2, pp. 193-230, 2003, available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1888625
56

57
Harry W. Arthurs, The Dependent Contractor: A Case Study of the Legal Problems of Countervailing
Power, 16 U. TORONTO L.J. 89 (1965).
58
Id. Arthurs relied on the work of Schmidt, The Law of Labour Relations in Sweden ch.III (Axel
Adlercreutz) (1962). In fact, the Swedish law is somewhat more murky, as later noted by a later author. See
Kallstrom, supra note 5.
59
Arthurs, supra note 56.
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independent businesses were often almost wholly dependent on the
patronage of the larger company.60 These ostensible business owners had
little in the way of control and would often stand or fall on the continued
business from the larger company.
As such, Arthurs argued that the law did these small business people
an injustice in ruling them outside of the bounds of the traditional labor
relationship.61 In fact, he argued, such businesspeople were economically
dependent upon a large company in virtually the same subordinate position
as an employee.62 The two situations were so analogous, he argued, that
employee-like protections should apply: “Insofar as dependent contractors
share a particular labour market with employees … they should be eligible
for unionization.”63
Arthurs reasoned persuasively that these workers
should truly be called “dependent contractors.” He then argued that this
group should be included within the definition of employees and that
employee protections should be extended to them.64
If devising a new application of the third category in Canada and
highlighting the struggle of small tradespeople was all Professor Arthurs
had done, that still would have been a worthwhile effort. But the influence
of his article spread far beyond academic circles. As the court in Fownes
Construction v. Teamsters noted, this was “one law review article which has
had an impact on the real world.”65 Arthurs’ influence was such that the
concept of “dependent contractor” became established within Canadian Law
during the 1970s.66 The effect was, in the words of subsequent
commentators, “beneficial for a significant number of workers formerly
60

Id.
Id.
Id.
63
Id. at 114.
64
Id. at 89. As Arthurs explained: “Unequal power between private persons, no less than between citizen
and state, is an unhappy fact of modern society. In one area – employment relations – public policy has clearly
adopted collective bargaining as a technique for redressing this imbalance of power. In another area – commercial
competition – collective action is generally suspect as the vehicle by which a powerful group may overwhelm
weak individuals. This study concerns the paradoxical plight of groups of competitors who may find survival
difficult without collective action. They are often economically vulnerable as individuals because of the
dominance of a monopoly buyer or seller of their goods or services, or because of disorganized market conditions.
If viewed as “independent contractors” rather than “employees” they lack the legal status which is a prerequisite
to the right to bargain collectively under labour relations legislation. As businessmen, they cannot legally employ
collective tactics to buy or sell or otherwise stabilize conditions because of he combines legislation. They are
prisoners of the regime of competition.”
65
Fownes Construction Co. Ltd. and Teamsters, [1974] 1 CLRBR 452 (British Columbia Labour Relations
Board).
66
See Brian A. Langille & Guy Davidov, Beyond Employees and Independent Contractors, 21 COMP. LAB.
L. & POL’Y J. 7, 25 (1999-2000) (“During the 1970s, most Canadian jurisdictions adopted ‘dependent contractor’
provisions to include such workers within the definition of ‘employee’ for collective bargaining purposes.”);
Michael Bendel, The Dependent Contractor: An Unnecessary and Flawed Development in Canadian Labour
Law, 22 U. TORONTO L.J. 374, 376 (1982) (“Although the notion of the dependent contractor did not surface in
Canada until 1965, concern for his status had become part of the conventional wisdom on labour relations by the
early 1970s. Between 1972 and 1977 seven jurisdictions in Canada adopted legislation to grant dependent
contractors employee status under their labor relations legislation.”).
61
62
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excluded from the ambit of collective bargaining laws.”67 In effect,
Arthurs’ academic work resulted in substantial law reform and the
extension of the employment laws to a group that had previously been
subordinate but that had few protections.68 Even a critic of the third
category, who largely viewed the category as largely superfluous, still
credited Professor Arthurs with instigating a rapid process of legal change.69
For an example, the Ontario Labour Relations Act defines
“employee” to include a “dependent contractor,” and a dependent contractor
to be:
a person, whether or not employed under a contract of
employment, and whether or not furnishing tools, vehicles,
equipment, machinery, or any other thing owned by the
dependent contractor, who perform work or services for
another person for compensation or reward on such terms
and conditions that the dependent contractor is in a position
of economic dependence upon, and under an obligation to
perform duties for, that person more closely resembling the
relationship of an employee than that of an independent
contractor.70
As another leading commentator has noted, the government has “introduced
this intermediate category into statutes in order to extend the reach of the
statute beyond typical employees.”71
The gig economy in Canada has yet to achieve the same market
saturation as it has in the United States, and as a consequence, there has
been little in way of legal adjudication as of the date of this writing. We
might have expected Uber, as one of the more dominant gig economy
companies, to have aggressively asserted itself in Canada as it has in many
U.S. cities. But Uber is largely an urban phenomenon, and Uber’s growth
in the larger Canadian cities seems to have been stymied by wrangling with
municipal governments in Toronto, Calgary, and Edmonton over insurance
and driver licensure requirements. Uber has been operating only
sporadically in Edmonton and Calgary because of its uncertain legal
67

Langille & Davidov, supra note 65 at 26.
CANADIAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS: THE REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LABOUR RELATIONS (1969) AT
30; REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON LABOUR LEGISLATION IN NEWFOUNDLAND AND LABRADOR 243-6
(1972).
69
Bendel, supra note 65 at 378 (“it seems safe to assume that all these amendments were inspired, in part at
least, by the recommendations of Professor Arthurs and the task force to the effect that labour relations laws
should be extended to persons who are not regarded as employees . . . but who shared the employees’ economic
dependence to the persons for whom they worked.”).
70
Ontario Labour Relations Act, S.O. 1995, c. 1, Sched. A, Section 1.
71
DAVID J. DOOREY, THE LAW OF WORK: COMMON LAW AND THE REGULATION OF WORK 24 (2016).
68

22-Oct-16]

Dependent Contractors?

15

status.72 On May 4, 2016, the Toronto City Council ultimately voted to
allow Uber to operate, after a protracted series of negotiations and legal
wrangling.73
The labour issues around platform work have yet to be heard by a
Canadian court or adjudicative body. As such, predictions are inherently
uncertain. But it does seem that the “dependent contractor” category and
accordingly expansive definition of “employee” will make it more likely
that gig economy workers will be able to access labour protections. One
could reason by analogy to cases involving taxicab services, limousines,
and cars for hire, and those cases largely found employee status. For
example, drivers working on a part-time basis were held to be employees
for purposes of the Canadian collective bargaining legislation, and as such
enjoyed the protective right to organize.74 Similar cases finding employee
status for part-time drivers in Canada have been decided in the context of
minimum wage75 and workers’ compensation.76 Of course, each of these
cases, like all cases dealing with employee status, looked very carefully at
the individualized work arrangements of the drivers, their shifts, the
dispatch policies, and other factors in order to make the determinations that
these were employees under Canadian law.
The one concern with finding Uber drivers and other gig workers to
be “dependent contractors” is that the “dependent contractor” definitions in
Canadian law focus on the concept of economic dependency on a single
company. In an instance where a driver performed services for multiple
online platforms or perhaps was only using gig work as a supplement to the
income from other employment, the definition might not provide coverage.
But as Uber and other companies have increasingly pushed workers into
72

For an interesting viewpoint, see Jerry Dias, Letting Uber Break the Law Legalizes the Underground
Economy, HUFFINGTON POST, Feb. 17, 2016, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/jerry-dias/uber-canadacontroversy_b_9252656.html (arguing that Uber must compete on the same level, with the same regulations, as
existing taxicab companies).
73
Uber To Be Legal in Toronto After City Council Vote, HUFFINGTON POST, May 4, 2016, available at
http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2016/05/04/uber-gets-green-light-from-city-council-to-operate-legally-intoronto_n_9840722.html. For a flavor of some of the litigation over these issues, see Abdullah v. Naziri, 2016
ONSC 2168 (CanLII) (dismissing taxicab union’s motion for a preliminary injunction, given that the City Council
would be taking action on the issue of the Uber driver’s licensure and insurance requirements); Edmonton (City)
v. Uber, 2015 ABQB 214 (CanLII).
74
This comparison was drawn in Ontario Taxi Workers’ Union v. Hamilton Cab, 2011 CanLII 782 (ONLB):
“The single plate owner/lessee operators and the drivers are both economically dependent upon Hamilton Cab,
notwithstanding the fact that neither receives compensation from it (other than the charge account fares paid by
Hamilton Cab to the owner/lessee operators). As stated by the Board in Niagara Veteran Taxi: “The purpose of
the dependent contractor amendments to the Act was, generally, to enable persons engage [sic] in collective
bargaining who, despite numerous earmarks of independent contractors, are in essence dependent for their
livelihood on the person or company for whom they perform services for compensation or reward. It would
thwart the intention of the Legislature if such persons were denied dependent contractor status just because they
receive their compensation directly from the client serviced rather than their employer. This is especially true
when neither the scheme of the Act nor the definition of “dependent contractor” stipulates that compensation or
reward must come directly from the employer.”
75
Castegar Taxi (1988) Ltd. V. Director of Employment Standards, 1991 CanLII 1088 (BCSC).
76
Decision No. 934/98, 2000 ONWSIAT 3346 (CanLII).
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standard shifts that function to preclude the possibility of employment on
other platforms, perhaps that is not an obstacle to their inclusion in the
category.
Ultimately, in Canada the third category of “dependent contractor”
has essentially resulted in an expansion of the definition of employee. The
earlier tests had been too rigid and made it difficult for small business
workers to claim benefits and protections. The category was enacted to
help those workers who were essentially working on their own in a position
of economic dependency, thus requiring labour protections. The expansive
and inclusive protection of Canadian labour law may help us as we evaluate
current proposals for a third category in the on-demand economy in the
United States.
B. The Italian Case:

Unintended Consequences and Arbitrage of the Categories
The Italian system of worker classification originated in the ancient
Roman Law notion of “locatio operarum” (right to control the worker) and
“locatio operis.” (contract for a specific result).77 This dichotomy was
translated into the two categories of independent contractor and employee
(in Italian, “subordinate worker”) in the Civil Code of 1942, with those
categories still in force today. A fundamental binary divide applies: only the
employee is the subject of the labour laws, and most workers are considered
employees.78 Article 2094 of the Civil Code (contract of service) covers
employees, but contains a vague definition: “a subordinate worker agrees to
collaborate with an employer in exchange for a remuneration, performing
intellectual or manual labour in the employment of and under the direction
of the entrepreneur.”79 The provision allows for the implementation of a
hierarchical structure, allowing the employer to organize work activities and
to react to insubordination. According to Article 2104 of the Civil Code,80
the employee has to observe the entrepreneur’s directions while performing
work tasks. As building blocks of the employment relationship, the
jurisprudence adopted the concept of “collaboration” or “co-working” (i.e.
the prolonged availability or continuance of the relationship and technical
77

The Roman distinction was between locatio conductio operarum, which refers to the classic master and
servant contract and implies the right to control and encompasses respondeat superior, and locatio conductio
conductio operis, which was based on the production of a specific result. See generally WILLIAM BURDIK,
PRINCIPLES OF ROMAN LAW AND THEIR RELATIONS TO MODERN LAW (1938); Matthew Finkin, Introduction,
COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 1, 1 (1999-2000).
78
Stefano Liebman, Employment situations and workers’ protection, National Studies, ILO, 1999, available
at
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_dialogue/--dialogue/documents/genericdocument/wcms_205366.pdf
79
Article 2094 of the Civil Code (Regio Decreto 16 marzo 1942, n. 262).
80
Article 2104 of the Civil Code (Regio Decreto 16 marzo 1942, n. 262).
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and structural subordination of the employee) and “dependence,” a socioeconomic concept, as the assets and tools of the business belonged to the
employer. These elements are considered the “legal distinctive feature of
both subordination and employment contract.”81
The definition of employee under Article 2094 of the Civil Code of
1942 has been widely criticized because of its vagueness.82 According to
Professor Lodovico Barassi, one of the great scholars of Italian labour law,
the distinctive element of “contract of employment” (literally “contratto di
lavoro”) concept was “eterodirezione,” which means mangerial and
disciplinary powers, i.e. the ability of the employer (conductor operarum)
to modify the content of the contractual relationship unilaterally.
Managerial power is a hallmark of employee status because it allows for
internal flexibility, i.e. the possibility of rearranging – even on a daily basis
– the concrete duties of the employee within the business.83
Other scholars have since grappled with this concept. Although the
bedrock of eterodirezione came from the Roman law (as a hierarchical
description of the relationship),84 the label was unable to describe
comprehensively the complexity of the employee category and the idea of
worker dignity. Scholars realized that “eterodirezione” was an incomplete
concept and thus developed other theories to explain the employment
relationship. One line of thought developed the concept of socio-economic
inferiority of the worker “who is considered—legally and socially—to be
the weaker party in the contract,” but there was no precise threshold for this
definition.85
Besides the “eterodirezione” or managerial power factor,86 the case
law developed a wide spectrum of subsidiary factors that could indicate the
presence of an employment relationship.87 A judge could disregard the
81
Orsola Razzolini, The Need to Go Beyond the Contract: ‘Economic’ and ‘Bureaucratic’ Dependence in
Personal Work Relations, 31 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 267, 270 (2010), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1607938
82
Michele Tiraboschi & Maurizio Del Conte, Employment Contract: Disputes on Definition in the Changing
Italian Labour Law, available at http://www.jil.go.jp/english/events/documents/clls04_delconte2.pdf
83
Razzolini, supra note 80 at 269. Industrial relations at the time was conceived of as a way to further the
interest of workers through socialist ideology. Remarkably, Professor Barassi wanted to distinguish the socioeconomic background of capitalist employment from the legal structure of the employment contract.
84
For a critical review, see LUCIANO SPAGNUOLO VIGORITA, SUBORDINAZIONE E DIRITTO DEL LAVORO:
PROBLEMI STORICO-CRITICI (1967); LAURA CASTELVETRI, IL DIRITTO DEL LAVORO DELLE ORIGINI, 222 (1994);
Luigi Mengoni, La questione della subordinazione in due trattazioni recenti, Riv. It. Dir. Lav., 1986, Id. IL
CONTRATTO DI LAVORO, MARIO NAPOLI, MILANO (2004).
85
Adalberto Perulli, Subordinate, Autonomous and Economically Dependent Work: A Comparative Analysis
of Selected European Countries, 137 in GIUSEPPE CASALE (ed), THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP – A
COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW (2011).
86
Cass.
22
November
1999
no
12926,
RIDL
200011633.
Moreover, in order to prove a subordinate relationship, this power should imply specific and well-defined
directives rather than programmatic and vague instructions, since the latters are also compatible with the
independent contractor’s category. Their compatibility with autonomous work are not sufficient for establishing
an employment relationship
87
Cass.
sez.
lav.,
27/03/2000,
n.
3674.
“When an assessment of unambiguous elements such as the exercise of the managerial and disciplinary power is
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contractual label when the substance of the work relationship contained
legal indicia of subordination (the so-called “primacy of facts” principle).88
These factors include: (i) the requirement that the worker follow reasonable
work rules; (ii) the length of relationship; (iii) the respect of set working
hours; (iv) salaried work; and (v) absence of risk of loss related to the
production. This is a multifactorial test and none of these elements is
dispositive.89
Turning to independent contractors, surprisingly, a definition does
not exist in Italian law. The self-employed worker contract is not a part of
the chapter of the Civil Code devoted to labour. Article 2222 of the Civil
Code, which governs businesses, defines “contratto d’opera” (contract for
service) as one carried out by a person “who performs work or services for
remuneration, mainly by means of his own labour and in the absence of a
relationship of subordination vis-a-vis the client.”90
Roughly speaking, general principles of civil and commercial law
apply to the self-employed worker (with some particularities since human
dignity is at stake), with the independent contractor considered “as
substantially and formally equal to the counterparty.”91 The statute operates
by contrast, as it refers “a contrario” to Article 2094 of the Civil Code:
independent work is performed without subordination. Moreover, an
independent contractor relationship is supposed to eliminate economic
subordination. The concrete content of the job performance could be
identical between an employee and an independent contractor, however.
The principle is that one could carry out “every kind of labour for which
payment is calculated, whether intellectual or manual,” in either category.92
This confirms that, for the purposes of the distinction between being an
employee and being an independent contractor, the core of the two
definitions is the way in which tasks are accomplished and structured.93
A leading case regarding misclassification by a courier service
highlights these principles.94 Despite the contractual label given to the
workers in the contract, the labour court ruled that the worker was actually
an employee on the basis of socioeconomic dependence. The court
reasoned that the delivery driver was part of the economic and business
not enough to distinguish among employee and self-employed (being the presence of the two powers a safe index
of subordination, while its absence is not an indisputable sign of autonomy)...”
88
Art. 1362 of the Italian Civil Code, provides that a contract must be interpreted with regard to the common
intention and the behavior of the parties, and not merely to the literal meaning of its wording.
89
Maurizio Del Conte, Lavoro autonomo e lavoro subordinato: la volontà e gli indici di denotazione,
Orientamenti Della Giurisprudenza Del Lavoro 66 (1995).
90
Article 2222 of the Civil Code (Regio Decreto 16 marzo 1942, n. 262).
91
See Perulli, supra note 84.
92
Cass., Sez. Lav., 03/04/2000, n. 4036
93
Tiraboschi & Del Conte, supra note 81 at 153.
94
It is surprising how, after decades and in a very different context, the job, i.e. driving and courier service
are so similar to what is offered in the gig economy today.
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organization of the principal.95 The case was appealed and the worker was
deemed to be an independent contractor. 96 The highest judicial authority,
Corte di Cassazione,97 agreed that this worker was an independent
contractor. The courier case demonstrates that in labour cases, judges have
considerable discretion to weigh the day-to-day facts on a case-by-case
basis, notwithstanding Italy’s civil law framework. More recently, however,
greater importance is given to the factual intentions of the parties, the socalled “nomen iuris” (i.e. contractual label) expressed at the signature of the
contract.98 Subsequent elaboration made it clear that workers could still
have a considerable amount of autonomy (granted by general and functional
directives) yet still be classified as employees.
The Introduction of the Legislation on “Para-subordinazione”
The Italian case is instructive for our purposes because, in 1973 the
legislature extended some protection to a tranche of self-employed workers,
planting the seeds of what later would become the intermediate category of
worker (literally “lavoratore parasubordinato” or “quasi-subordinate”)
situated between employee and independent contractor.
Italian Law 533/1973 sought to extend certain procedural protection
to the weakest of the independent contractors, and perhaps incidentally
brought about the genesis of the third category, deemed “lavoratore
parasubordinato.” Comprised of a sub-set of self-employed workers, these
lavoratore parasubordinato were distinguished as those workers who were
“collaborating with a principal/buyer under a continuous, coordinated and
predominantly personal relationship, although not of subordinate character.”
Four “concurrent” factors need to be ascertained in order to denote this
intermediate category: (i) collaboration; (ii) continuity and length of the
relationship; (iii) functional coordination with the principal; (iv) a
predominantly personal service. 99
The quasi-subordinate workers were commonly called “co.co.co” as
an abbreviation for “continuous and coordinated collaborators.” As a
95
Pret. Milano 20 giugno 1986, in Riv. it. dir. lav., 1987, II, p. 70.
“The work, performed by the biker assigned to pick up and delivery and by using the own vehicle, has to be
considered “subordinate”, in spite of the length, the possibility of refusing to execute the request for the
performance and even in presence if of a monitoring activity (in radio contact)”
96
Trib. Milano 10 ottobre 1987, in Riv. it. dir. lav., 1987, II, p. 688.
“The work, performed by the biker assigned to pick up and delivery and by using the own vehicle, has not to be
considered “subordinate”, in the absence of the critical requirement of continuity. Those workers are not required
to appear everyday at the workplace and can refuse to execute the request for the performance”
97
Cass. 14 aprile 1989 n. 5671 (mass.).
98
This idea could seem inconsistent with the multifactorial test aimed at inferring the nature of the contract
by analysing the concrete ways in which the overall performance is accomplished, disregarding the wording of the
contracts (“primacy of facts”). See Cass 29 May 1996 no 4948, DPL 1996, 3338.
99
This element is listed among the causes of this legal tool as the difference between managerial power
(eterodirezione) and the notion of “coordination” seems too subtle.
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consequence, the legislation was partly responsible for a relaxation of the
rigid employee/independent contractor dichotomy.. What is remarkable is
the fact that the 1973 Italian law does not aim at reacting against disguised
employment relationships, conversely “it is something physiologically
connected to certain kinds of economic organizations that the law has to
recognize and regulate.”100
Looking at the content of the lavoratore parasubordinato category,
not all rights of employees were extended to these workers. On the one
hand, the protections did include access to labour courts. These rights,
however, were limited, and basically procedural, as these quasi-subordinate
workers were still considered outside the scope of the substantive labour
law. It was much cheaper to hire a quasi-surbordinate worker than an
employee, because employees are entitled to substantive labor rights, annual
leave, sick leave, maternity leave, other employee benefits, overtime, and
job security against unfair dismissal.101 At that time, the quasi-subordinate
workers enjoyed none of these substantive protections.
Within the first decade after the introduction of the third category,
undesirable effects occurred. Businesses increasingly began to hire workers
on under the lavoratore parasubordinato category. Most of these quasisubordinate workers would all previously have been classified as
employees. Consequently, the lavoratore parasubordinato category was
being used to hide bona fide employment relationships in order to reduce
costs and evade the protections workers are entitled to under Article 2094 of
the Civil Code.
Over time, the result was employer arbitrage between the categories.
As a consequence, workers saw a “gradual erosion of the protections
afforded to employees through jobs that are traditionally deemed to
constitute master-servant relationships in the strict sense[,] progressively
entering the no man’s land of an inadequately defined notion.”102 This state
of affairs persisted for two decades without intervention from the
legislature. Towards the end of the last century, the number of quasisubordinate workers increased dramatically. They were seen as a “lowcost” alternative to stable employment relationships, especially because “no
social security contributions had to be paid in their regard by the principal,
at that time.”103 In 1995, with the Pension Reform, Act No 335 of 1995, the
legislature did enact a modest intervention by granting self-employed
100
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workers social security contributions previously reserved for employees.104
In 2003, the legislature amended the content of the quasisubordinate category with the Legislative Decree No. 276/2003 (the socalled Biagi Reform). Since many workers that functioned as employees
were incorrectly classified as quasi-subordinate by businesses, the
legislature required the [collaboration] be linked to at least one “project.”
Thus, a new definition emerged for quasi-subordinate workers: “lavoro a
progetto” (i.e. project work, also “co.co.pro”). The legislature intended the
measure to verify the authenticity of the [collaborations] and protect against
businesses
disguising
employees
as
quasi-subordinate.
The
“accomplishment of a specific project, programme or phase of production”
was an indispensable element for checking the validity of a project work
contract. If there was no actual project, i.e. the work was continuous and
managed by the business, the worker could be reclassified into a standard
employment contract and the business would be liable for backpay. These
projects were required to be fixed term contracts with a definite end date.
However, the “lavoro a progetto” (i.e. project work, “co.co.pro”)
reduced the role of the continuity and coordination elements of the original
1973 definition by discouraging long-term employment and also limiting
the managerial influence over the quasi-subordinate worker.105 This
modification was supposed to counter-balance the contractual power of the
employer by defining in advance the details and conditions of the project.106
The central aim of the intervention at issue was to reduce the number of
precarious forms of employment leading to illicit work and evasion of
social insurance contributions. 107 In addition to the requirement of a linkage
to a project, the legislature extended a series of social security benefits for
maternity, sick leave, and worker’s compensation to quasi-subordinate
workers. Professor Perulli theorized that the quasi-subordinate group was
only a “zone,” rather than its own category or “tertium genus.” As a general
policy evaluation, a Green Paper issued by the Commission of the European
Communities in 2006 defined these reform efforts “somewhat tentative and
partial,” although they expressed the will of the Italian legislature “to tackle
problems in this complex area.”108
Although the centrality of the notion of the project was greeted as
“the most innovative [and critical] element . . . in the legislative decrees
104
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implementing the Biagi law,” it was not as successful as its proponents had
expected it would be.109 The Biagi law was criticized “for questionable
techniques, the unsuitability of the selection requirements, deficient
protective measures and the inappropriateness of the severe yet inefficient
sanction system.” 110 Despite the legislature’s effort to safeguard the rights
of quasi-subordinate workers, their overall level of rights and protection
remained less than those granted to employees.
In 2012, the Italian legislature passed Law No. 92/2012 (the socalled Monti-Fornero Reform)111 to counteract the misuse of the “lavoro a
progetto” definition by making employee status the default.112 For quasisubordinate workers, businesses could no longer exercise or interfere in the
project worker’s autonomy; they could not exercise managerial power over
the day-to-day work.113 Moreover, the Monti-Fornero Reform stated that
the project may not merely overlap the employer’s core business or consist
merely of executing low-skilled or routine duties. The law also granted a
substantive set of rights to the quasi-subordinate workers, in that it required
compensation compliant with minimum compensation levels.114 The MontiFornero Reform affirmed that, in the absence of a project, the worker was to
be considered an employee, backdated to the beginning of the relationship.
The intervention was just one of several policies aimed at promoting “a
general reshaping of labour protections to “counter the misuse of the legal
schemes already introduced in order to provide flexibility.”115 The MontiFornero Reform made it clear that using the quasi-subordinate category was
disfavoured and discouraged. Not only did the cost of using workers in that
category increase, it also created burdensome regulations and bureaucracy.
109
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Finally, the 2015 “Jobs Act” fundamentally eliminated the concept
of project work that had its genesis in the 2003 Biagi law. This was
intended to reduce the use of atypical contracts and to establish the principle
that the default category is employee. This trend has been part of longlasting political action aimed at “moving as many employment contracts as
possible, in a gradual manner over a period of time, from the uncertain grey
area of atypical employment to the area of salaried employment.”116 The
legislature implemented incentives, including funding of some employee
benefits and liberalizing dismissal requirements, that made the classification
as an employee a more favoured option.117 While the quasi-subordinate
category stills exists, it is now limited in its scope as well as its protections,
further emphasizing the shift of workers into the employee category. 118
Essentially, this is a return to the binary distinction of employee and
independent contractor. The legislature introduced a new notion of
“collaborations organized by the principal,” offering to scholars and courts
a definition that raises many doubts as to framework, boundaries and
practical effects. The Jobs Act is still new and has not been fully
implemented, so we will need to wait to determine what the impact will be
for the classification question.119
Policy Lessons from the Italian Experience
with the Quasi-Subordinate Category
For the past two decades, the story of the quasi-subordinate category
in Italy has been one of struggle, second guessing, and revision. After its
promulgation, the third category became a discounted alternative to a
standard employment contract. Introducing a third category initially
resulted in arbitrage of the classifications, and resulted in an increase in
precarious and non-standard work. That remained the case in spite of the
gradual extension of protective measures through the reforms up until 2015.
Businesses used the quasi-subordinate category as a way to hide what
should have been standard employees into a discounted status with fewer
rights and benefits. While the goal of the original legislation establishing
116
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and supporting the quasi-subordinate category was to extend labour
protections and increase flexibility those goals were never realized.
Instead, in 2015 the Jobs Act changed course by implementing a
strong presumption of employee status. In light of the serious misuses of the
quasi-subordinate category, the category itself has now been minimized and
discouraged.120 Unfortunately, in the words of Professor Perulli, the history
of the quasi-subordinate category is an “unfortunate series of legislative
interventions.”121
The third category was not a panacea for the
misclassification issue. Instead the changes created even more uncertainty
for both businesses and workers.
Turning to the gig economy itself, to date Italy has largely
considered ridesharing services under the auspices of fair competition law.
In 2015, the Tribunale di Milano banned Uber from operating a service that
resembled that provided by licensed and regulated taxis. Italian courts have
yet to make a determination about the classification status of the drivers on
ridesharing platforms122. More comprehensive regulation may be coming
as there was a proposal in March 2016 to regulate the sharing economy in
Italy. This proposal, however, also did not focus on the misclassification or
labour issues. At the level of the EU, there is a movement to harmonize
legislation across Europe so as to become more attractive to digital
platforms and new economy companies. The EU, however, is also
concerned about these platforms disguising employment relationships. As
of the date of this article, various reforms and proposals are just beginning
to be studied and debated.
C. An Economic Threshold for the Third Category:
The Spanish Case
The Spanish Workers’ Act was passed in 1980, roughly ten years after
Italy had engaged in major legislative reform. This law, Estatuto de los
Trabajadores, covers only employees, defined as “those individuals who
voluntarily perform their duties, in exchange for compensation, within the
limits of the organisation and under the directions of a natural or juridical
person, referred to as employer or entrepreneur.”123 Spanish independent
120
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contractors were left to constitutional, civil and commercial provisions of
the law.124 Just like Italy and Canada, the law started with a binary divide
between independent contractor and employee status. The rest of this
section will describe the Spanish system and the 2007 reforms in more
depth.
The traditional binary classification between employees and
independent contractors in Spain depended upon a determination of selforganization, as an exercise of contractual autonomy. Spanish case law has
interpreted the definition of an employee to be a combination of two
[concurrent] elements: (i) the exercise of managerial power (“dirección”),
and (ii) how much autonomy the workers have.125 Spanish legal scholars
have focused on the element of “alienness” (“ajenidad”, also defined as
“ownership by another”) as a factor in determining whether an individual is
an employee. “Alienness” focuses on the allocation of risk, and
consequently, the ownership of “the means of production and the financial
benefits obtained by the company from the employee’s work.”126 As with
other jurisdictions such as Italy and the United States, the contractual label
set by the parties is not dispositive. Rather, a judicial assessment of the
substance of the relationship (e.g., day-by-day arrangements) is
dispositive.127
More recently, Spanish case law has paid more attention to the
presence of a hierarchy and the organizational integration of the employee
(i.e. the presence of directorial/managerial power). Until a few years ago,
labour courts interpreted the definition of employee expansively, using a
default assumption of an employment relationship.128 To determine whether
an individual is an employee, case law analyses the following concurrent
elements: (i) the level of integration within the organization; (ii) the
dependency upon one employer; (iii) fixed working time; (iv) provision of
professional tools and uniform; (v) the extent of an employee’s decisionmaking power.
According to the government-funded research centre EurWORK, in
Spain and many other European countries, the independent contractor
124
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category was used to hide bona fide employment relationships.129 Hiding
employees as independent contractors was especially prevalent in the
building and construction sector of the economy. Both large and medium
businesses in the construction industry resorted to subcontracting for tasks
“that demanded relatively low levels of skills and qualification and were
easily controllable.”130 Over time, the growth towards a “new generation”
of self-employment (e.g., freelance consulting) accelerated, since recruiting
self-employed workers was more convenient than hiring employees. Also,
self-employed workers were desirable because businesses wanted to
mobilize and de-mobilize their workforces rapidly to ensure a certain degree
of flexibility and fluidity.
In 1995, Spanish social partners (CCOO, “Confederacion Sindacal
de Consumes Obrera,” UGT, “Union General de Trabajadores,” and the
Government jointly signed the Toledo Compact (“Pacto de Toledo”).131
The aim of the Toledo Compact was to criticize the absence of legislation
governing independent contractors. In 2002, a trade union proposed the
widening of rights for independent contractors who were economically
dependent.132 The proposal was engendered by a trend of modernization as
well as flexibilization of the national industrial relations that ended the era
when the employee was the “protagonist” of the social and political life of
Spain.133 It was developed after the final plan envisioned by the European
Council of Lisbon (2000) that aimed to shape a more competitive social
Europe.134
In 2007, the Spanish legislature, after debates and proposals,135
enacted a new law (Law 20/2007, July 11, Estatuto del trabajo autónomo,
LETA, i.e. Statute for Self-Employed Workers).136 LETA regulated all
forms of self-employed or independent contractor-type of work and covered
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all aspects of self-employment.137 This is the most commonly recognized
virtue of the Spanish legislative intervention towards an “experimental
direction.”138 Self-employed workers are defined as individuals “not subject
to the authority or organization of another person.” This comprehensive and
systematic intervention was justified in the light of the profound changes
that the Spanish labour market was undergoing.139
Workers who are part of this self-employed or independent
contractor contactor category are entitled to benefits in the case of
termination (“prestación por cese de actividad”), maternity and paternity
leave, temporary sickness (“prestación social por incapacidad temporal”),
and beneficial social security programs for special groups (disabled, artisans
or young entrepreneurs, inter alia). Moreover, self-employed workers can
retire early when employed in dangerous industries (“jubilación
anticipada”), without forfeiting social security benefits. Lastly, they can
collectively organize and exercise collective rights, including the right to
strike and to bargain collectively (“acuerdos de interés profesional”).140
The Creation of the TRADE
Most interestingly for our analysis, LETA also crafted a third
category of workers: “Trabajador Autonomo Economicamente
Dependiente” (or TRADE, i.e. economic dependent self-employed worker).
Since Spain has a civil legal system workers needed to rely on legislation to
claim their rights. The legislature, in passing TRADE was trying to ensure
increased protections for a subset of independent contractors. The TRADE
were not extended the complete set of protections reserved to employees,
but “only protections specifically provided by [LETA].” This intermediate
category captures the Italian notion of legal dependency in the quasisubordinate or “lavoratori parasubordinati” category.
TRADE workers enjoy some legal protections such as minimum
wage, annual leave, entitlements in case of wrongful termination, right to
137
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by drafting a “comprehensive and systematic legal framework covering all aspects of self-employment.” See
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suspend work for family or health reasons, and collective bargaining. They
are entitled to an annual vacation, a set number of days off per week, a limit
on working hours, and the right to be covered by insurance against workrelated accidents and diseases and protection for workers unemployed as a
result of business failure.141 As a result, they enjoy a set of rights “beyond
the statement of basic rights and duties of self-employed workers – vaguely
reminiscent of those of employees, albeit without equivalent guarantees or
legal status [of employees].”142 The distinction between the employee and
the TRADE categories lies in the notion of “alienness,” or ajenidad,
described above. While the employee does not own the means of
production and the productive tools and infrastructure, the TRADE owns
his or her tools and is equipped with all the hallmarks of genuine selfemployment. 143
It should be emphasized that the category was not a reaction to
disguised employment relationships, but a way to offer a special legal
arrangement for authentic self-employed workers. The legislative
intervention represents a wider trend of expanding the class of individuals
protected by labour law. The trend is motivated by the desire to protect
workers in the “grey area” or at the margin of the self-employment
category. In particular, according to Professor Cruz Villalon, the focus on
managerial power and the degree of organization was reduced
progressively, to such an extent that self-employed jobs ended up being
included within the employee category (namely, domestic work, teleworking, work in group).144 As a result of the introduction of TRADE, the
traditional “binary divide” was ended.
The crucial component for determining whether a worker is a
TRADE rests on a threshold of economic dependency measured by a
percentage, in the law, 75%. There are other criteria, framed as
multifactorial tests that may also be considered. To distinguish TRADE
from employees, the factors include: (i) amount of independent work or
reliance on the principal’s directives; (ii) the worker undertakes an
obligation of personal service, without using subcontractors; (iii) the worker
bears the entrepreneurial risk; (iv) actual ownership of the tools and
instrumentalities of production. To distinguish TRADE from independent
contractors or self-employed workers, the factors include: (i) a dependence
141
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on the principal for at least 75% of the worker’s income;145 (ii) not hiring
subcontractors, (iii) the performance of an economic or professional activity
directly and predominantly vis-à-vis one single principal. An implicit
requirement of TRADE encompasses “continuity of the performance,” this
is why the 2007 LETA also regulates working hours, holidays, time and
place of the duties rendered. In sum, the critical element of the TRADE test
is the percentage of income gained from work-related or economic or
professional activities from a single principal.
There are numerous formal and procedural requirements to become
classified as a TRADE worker. In furtherance of contractual freedom,
article 12 of LETA states that the worker himself has to disclose his status
as a TRADE to the principal at the time of inception of the contract and to
“register” the position with the social administration agency. Furthermore,
any change in the worker’s situation that affects the worker’s status as a
TRADE (e.g., alteration of the percentage of the worker’s economic
dependency) needs to be disclosed to the principal and the administrative
agency. The principal may need to verify information provided by the
worker. These strict requirements are burdensome and time-consuming for
both workers and businesses.146
A debate has developed both among scholars and judges about the
legal effect when these procedural elements are not followed. In 2011, the
Tribunal Supremo has resolved the debate by stating that the disclosure of
the worker as a TRADE is an “ad substantiam” requirement (i.e. it is
mandatory),147 while the social security registration has an “ad
probationem” effect (i.e. permissive). 148 The New Spanish Labour
Procedure Act 36/2011 affirmed that the TRADE contract must be
formalized in order to be valid.149 Absent a written contract, the
presumption is that a worker is an employee. In 2015 a new reform granted
the TRADE a number of additional safeguards, such as subcontracting for
an annual period as a worker in the case of maternity or paternity leave,
among other situations. 150 The reform was intended to reconcile private
145
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and professional life by preventing such situations from causing the
termination of the contract. 151
The Low Number of TRADE Workers and Developments on the EU Level
In Spain, few workers have actually become classified as TRADE.
This is a result of the burdensome procedural requirements required for
TRADE status. Only 9,000 TRADE contracts were signed in 2012
compared to the 400,000 forecasted.152 In 2014, according to Servicio
Público de Empleo TRADE,153 the population of self-employed workers was
several million, while the number of TRADE was less than 16,000. This
number is inconsistent, as in the same year, Instituto Nacional de Estadística
counted 258,000 TRADE. Still, even if we use the higher number, that
would still only account for “12.5% of the total number of self-employed
workers without employees[.].”154
Meanwhile, Spanish labour unions complained that the TRADE
category was inappropriately covering what should be traditional
employment relationships. Conversely, employers’ associations were afraid
of the opposite risk: that the category would swallow up authentic selfemployed workers, augmenting business costs. According to Professor Cruz
Villalòn, each category is being devalued; employees are pushed to
reclassify as TRADE, and TRADE are being pushed to reclassify as selfemployed or independent contractors. Moreover, Villalòn criticized
TRADE as creating an artificial economic dependency threshold and,
ultimately, an artificial category.155
Unfortunately, the European Commission had predicted an
unsuccessful outcome of the TRADE category in a Green Paper: “while
increasing certainty and transparency and ensuring a minimum level of
protection of the self-employed, such requirements could, however, have
the effect of limiting the scope of these contractual arrangements.”156 It
could be concluded that this legislation should be revisited, also in terms of
content, because it offers protections too close to those of the typical
151
Also while breastfeeding a child under nine months, or to take rest periods for adoption or pre-adoptive or
permanent foster care, or to take care of a child under the age of seven in charge, or a family member in a
dependent or a relative disability.
152
According to recent surveys by the Spanish organization “Unión de Asociaciones de Trabajadores
Autónomos y Emprendedores,” only 2.4% of the workforce have one principal and consequently “were covered
by the fairly extensive protections [for TRADE] afforded by the Law of 2007.”
153
[Insert latest statistic]
154
V. T. Alvarez Martín Nieto, Caída de los autónomos económicamente dependientes, available at
http://cincodias.com/cincodias/2015/02/09/autonomos/1423494891_645557.html.
155
Juan Antonio Hernández Nieto, La desnaturalización del trabajador autónomo: el autónomo
dependiente, Revista universitaria de ciencias del trabajo, N. 11, 2010, 177-194
156
Commission of the European Communities, Modernising Labour Law to Meet the Challenges of the 21st
Century: Green Paper, COM (2006) 708 final (2006), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52006DC0708&from=EN

22-Oct-16]

Dependent Contractors?

31

employee.
Interestingly, a Barcelona judge has referred several questions about
on demand economy to the European Court of Justice. The European Court
of Justice is expected to decide whether Uber is a taxi service or a digital
service provider.157
D. Summary and Assessment of the Outcomes in Canada, Spain, and
Italy
Having examined in detail the ways that the Canadian, Italian, and
Spanish legal systems have established frameworks for dealing with the
third category, we can take some guidelines from these experiences. Some
of these lessons are directly applicable to the recent proposals for creating a
third category for gig economy platform workers. We have seen three
different histories and three different outcomes, showing us mistakes as
well as successes. Spain provided an example of a legal system that
adopted a third category, but saw it only made applicable to a small
percentage of self-employed workers. The law assumes that TRADE
workers are predominantly working for one business; this could be a
problem for platform workers who are working for multiple platforms.
Looking at the causes of this very limited use of the category, it comes
down to a heavy burden of requirements to be met, including the use of a
strict economic threshold.
From Italy’s various experiments with the third category, we saw an
indecisive and almost mercurial modification of the third category in the
years since its adoption. Businesses used the Italian third category as a
discounted alternative to what should have been a standard employment
relationship. In fact, companies used the presence of the third category of
parasubordinato to evade regulations applicable to employees, such as
social security contributions. In essence the quasi-subordinate category
created a loophole that actually resulted in less protection for workers, as an
unintended consequence. Attempts were made through the years to adjust
the category in order to provide appropriate coverage. Each successive
action by the Italian legislature was an emergency intervention as a reaction
to the misuse of the third category. The end result was confusion and since
2015, the third category is extremely limited and workers are presumed to
be employees.
There is a difference in the genesis, the content and the effects of the
intermediate category between Spain and Italy.158 Italy’s framework enacted
157
See Murad Ahmed, Judge refers Spanish Uber case to European Court of Justice, FT.COM, available at
http://on.ft.com/1DqlTdc.
158
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32

Cherry & Aloisi

[22-Oct-16

by the 1973 Reform does not provide substantive protections. Protections
reserved to TRADE are much stronger than the ones reserved to lavoratori
parasubordinati. In both Spain and Italy, the intermediate category was
misused. In Italy, the intermediate category was used to disguise bona fide
employment relationships. In Spain, arbitrage of the categories shifted what
should have been TRADE workers into independent contractor status
because of the high level of legal protection and burdensome procedures
associated with being in the TRADE category.
As for Canada, the passage of legislation in the 1970s technically
created a third category of “dependent contractors” through amending the
definition of “employee” in various statutes. The practical result of the
“dependent contractor” category was to expand the definition of employee
and to bring more workers under the ambit of labour law protection. The
end result was increased coverage and the provision of a safe harbor for
workers in need of protections, based on economic dependency. The third
category seems to have worked well in terms of expanding the coverage of
the laws to an increasing number of workers.
V.
ANALYSIS OF WORKER MISCLASSIFICATION
IN THE GIG ECONOMY: SOLUTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
The implementations of the hybrid category in Canada, Italy, and
Spain long predated the development of platform crowdwork. Even before
platforms and mobile apps, the binary test between employee classification
and independent contractor left many workers in a no man’s land. Those
workers included delivery drivers, errand runners, odd job workers, and
couriers, many providing services that in many respects resemble the
services provided by modern-day gig economy companies TaskRabbit,
Postmates, Grubhub, and Uber. As such these countries’ experiences with
adoption of the third category are useful in terms of evaluating what types
of policies are successful and which have met with problems.
At the outset, we should note that the debate over misclassification
actually can be interpreted two different ways. One way to view the issue is
to acknowledge that there has been legitimate confusion about forms of gig
work that do not fit easily into the binary distinctions currently recognized
under U.S. law. After all, gig-workers have some characteristics that are
common to independent contractors and yet others that are reminiscent of
employees. In fact, the question of proper classification may be confusing
even without the addition of technology; work can be structured in varying
ways. The problem, under this view, lies with a legal test that is malleable,
fact-intensive, and difficult to apply. The other way to consider the
misclassification issue is to acknowledge that there has long been arbitrage
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of the law – illegitimate practices that lead to misclassification of what truly
are employment relationships. These practices serve to hide employment
relationships under the guise of “false” or “bogus” contractor situations.
Note that these two views of the misclassification problem are not
mutually exclusive. It is possible to have a poorly constructed multifactorial test and, at the same time, to have businesses arbitraging the test to
take advantage of the savings from classifying a worker as an independent
contractor.
Any legislative or judicial intervention on this issue must take
account of both views. If establishing a third category might alleviate
legitimate confusion about how to apply to the test to gig workers, that
would solve the first problem. However, if the consequences of
establishing such a third category would be arbitrage and downgrading of
employees to intermediate status, that would do nothing to eliminate bogus
contractor status, in fact, adding a third category would only increase the
amount of arbitrage. Three categories create more room for mischief than
two, and we can see from the Italian case that such arbitrage there became
widespread in response to the adoption of the quasi-subordinate workers.
A. Working Backward to Determine Rights for the Third Category
Another way to look at this problem is to work backwards and ask
which of the rights and responsibilities that employees enjoy would not be
appropriate for workers in the intermediate category? As we saw from the
Italian and Spanish cases, what kinds of rights and responsibilities go along
with the third category are just as important, if not more important, than the
creation of the category itself. The rights available could be very few,
mirroring independent contractor status, or, as in Spain, the rights could
closely resemble those of employees. Either way, there are serious risks to
face. Construct the third category with too few rights (as in the Italian
case), and then it will run the risk of arbitrage, with businesses forcing
genuine employees into the third category to try to lower costs. But make
the third category either too generous or too burdensome to opt into, as has
been the case with the TRADE in Spain, and then very few will bother
using the category. Continuing with this line of inquiry, the process of
trying to work backwards to determine which rights these gig workers
would have available and which they would not be entitled to is far more
complicated than it appears. What rights and obligations would be left out
of the hybrid category?
As an example of engagement with this line of analysis, consider the
Harris and Krueger proposal in which those falling into the “independent
worker” category would not be guaranteed minimum wage. The reasoning
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behind the proposed exclusion is that, Harris and Krueger argue that in the
gig economy it is difficult to determine an hourly wage and that, in addition,
the hours may be impossible to trace across platforms.159 However, that
argument shows a lack of understanding about the technology that is used
for for crowdwork. Contrary to Harris and Krueger’s assertion, there is no
lack of data or difficulty tracing hours. In fact, the platforms that enable the
matching of workers with those who need their services also allow for the
gathering of data about the work and the workers on a completely
unprecedented scale.
Indeed, most ridesharing apps feature real-time GPS tracking and
updated ratings from customers, but those are just the features that are
visible to users. There is other data generated by both workers and
customers that is collected and analyzed by platform companies, much of
which is used to improve future performance. Indeed, many platforms can
measure precisely how much time and effort was spent on a task, down to
the minute spent waiting in traffic, in the case of a ridesharing app, or down
to the keystroke in the case of crowdwork. In fact, one of the major
concerns with platform work is not difficulty tracing time, work, and hours
as Harris and Krueger posit, but rather the constant and pervasive
surveillance through GPS, phone, and app data.160
The idea of exempting gig workers from minimum wage requirements
seems poorly thought-out.161 To date, many of the gig-worker cases that
have alleged worker misclassification umbrella have been FLSA claims.162
One of the most salient complaints that gig workers have brought forward is
the lack of a living wage or decent pay. As documented in one of the
author’s previous articles dating back to 2009, many crowdwork platforms
pay less than minimum wage, with some paying amounts that are on
average less than half that of the federal minimum wage.163
Meanwhile, there has been a widespread move by the “Fight for
Fifteen” campaign to raise the minimum wage in the United States to fifteen
dollars per hour.164 Statistics show that the current federally mandated
minimum wage is low enough that a full-time minimum wage salary will
not cover food and rent for a working family.165 If there is a generally a
159
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movement to raise the federal minimum wage, how does it make sense to
have a proposal concurrently to eliminate minimum wage completely for
gig workers? This is a rhetorical question of course; as one of the authors
has previously written, exempting certain work from minimum wage would
only exacerbate the problem of exploitation of workers in the gig
economy.166
If retracting the minimum wage for the gig economy seems problematic,
what about excluding other rights from the gig worker hybrid category?
Would we choose to exempt platforms from generally applicable laws that
prohibit employers from making employment decisions based on prohibited
factors such as race, sex, age, and disability?167 On platforms, especially
those involving purely digital labor, individual workers are often faceless
and nameless. But that too may be a flawed assumption, a even a screen
name or a picture of dark skin – or even an avatar with darker skin – might
result in employment discrimination. Real world provision of services
through platforms has even more potential for biases based on customer
prejudice. Researchers have begun to document that in fact biases can be
embedded deep in the review and rating systems that many platforms use.168
There is a great deal of jurisprudence under Title VII holding that so-called
“customer preference” for workers of a certain race or gender is not an
excuse for employment discrimination.169 The fact that customer ratings are
now embedded in online platforms and in fact may sometimes be the only
factor used to terminate a worker’s access to the app is troubling.170
What about excluding other protections from the category? Should gig
workers have the ability to report crimes that they notice on the job to law
enforcement without retaliation? If a gig worker is injured while carrying
out an assignment obtained from a platform should the worker have the
right to collect worker’s compensation or is redress for the tort system?
Ultimately, the “working backwards” plan to determine which aspects of
labour and employment law are expendable for gig workers is a losing
proposition. The analysis set out above creates an impossible dilemma, in
terms of which rights to eliminate, especially when those granted to
employees in the United States are meager compared to those guaranteed to
workers in many industrialized nations.171 Each of these laws or sets of
laws was passed in order to give workers basic protections that they could
166
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not achieve on their own, due to the imbalance of power between workers
and employers. Cutting one or two protections only for the sake of creating
a discounted category seems not only artificial, but bears no rational
relationship to the realities of gig work or the technology that is being used
on platforms themselves.
B. Practical Difficulties with Implementation of a Third Category
Apart from difficulties in defining the third category and what
protections or exclusions it would contain, We also feel that it is important
to note that, solely on a practical level, it might be difficult to create a third
category solely for gig workers in the United States. Proponents have made
it seem like creating the third category will be natural or easy.172 But it
would actually be a complex legislative intervention, largely in part because
there would have to be hard decisions, as mentioned above, about which
rights and responsibilities to include and exclude from the categories. Then
determining where a worker would fit within the three categories would
also have its own doctrinal elements and the potential for misclassification,
arbitrage, and confusion.
It is possible that judges and administrative bodies could, on their own
authority, shift their interpretation of the statutes so as to carve out or
constitute an intermediate category. But this is unlikely, given the way that
the statutes are written. Adding a third classification when the statutes only
call for two categories would constitute a vast feat of judicial activism. It
would also be seen as the kind of process that would likely require political
debate and discussion associated more with legislation than with judicial
decision making. Finally, the content of the hybrid category would need to
be discussed and debated. In light of the political decisions and
consequences that surround the issue of the third category, judges would
like demur from creating a new category without guidance from the
legislature.
The ridesharing cases provide an illustrative example. In the Cotter v.
Lyft case in the Northern District of California, Judge Vince Chhabria
famously stated that the case was like being “handed a square peg and asked
to choose between two round holes…”173 Yet, even acknowledging that the
gig workers were not a particularly good fit for either employee or
independent contractor status, Judge Chhabria turned the case over to the
jury, and now is presiding over the settlement agreement. And so, even
judges who have criticized the on/off switch as not a particularly good
172
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match for the realities of work today have not gone so far as to create
another category.
Therefore, creating a third category in the U.S. for gig workers would
most likely require legislative action. It is true that there has recently been
some legislation that has directly responded to recent technological
developments, such as the JOBS Act for online crowdfunding.174 At the
same time, there have been other situations where legislation has lagged
woefully behind technological developments. In still other situations,
legislation has ended or otherwise cracked down on technology. Online
prediction markets that allowed participants to engage in forecasting about
future political, economic, or social events were unwittingly outlawed by
the Unlawful Internet Gambling Act of 2006.175 Legislative change can be
slow, unwieldy and difficult to predict. There are also changes that would
need to happen in state legislatures, as many states have statutes that
similarly only apply to employees. Ultimately, the possibility of political
change is uncertain, and the intervention is far from a panacea.
C. Shifting Towards a Default Presumption of Employee Status
One way to govern the difficult classification issues that have arisen is
to make changes that involve the default presumptions around employee
and independent contractor status. Because it will be difficult to implement
a third category and there is, as of yet, little or no consensus on how to
constitute the category or how it might meet the needs of platforms and gig
workers, a third category may not be feasible. To address current
misclassification issues, one solution might be to change the default
presumptions vis-a-vis the two categories that already exist. Currently,
many platform companies operate in an environment where the triangular
relationship between the platform, customer, and worker obscures the role
of the platform as employer.176 If a company deems workers to be
independent contractors, it is left up to the workers, or perhaps to
government agencies like the Social Security Administration or the Internal
Revenue Service to contest that status as misclassification. Such a default
actually encourages misclassification, as there is the potential that no one
will notice or want to invest the time, patience, and effort in starting an
administrative action or lawsuit to challenge the firm’s initial
misclassification. It is true that misclassification can result in costly legal
174
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challenges and in some instances lead to penalties, but many companies are
willing to take that risk in the hopes that it will not get to that point. In
other words, they feel it is better to risk asking for forgiveness, rather than
first getting permission.177 Meanwhile, workers face high transaction costs
in trying to get the work re-classified: the time and expense of becoming
involved in a lawsuit. As the jobs involved often encompass low-paid
casual work, the effort may not be worthwhile.
Instead of the current system in which the firm chooses how to classify
workers and then later justifies its position in litigation, what if we began
with a different presumption. Assume that above a minimum threshold of
hours worked, the default rule would be an employment relationship. That
would be the case even if the work was on a platform or worked online. It
would be an employment relationship even if the arrangement was flexible,
even if the worker provided his or her own tools of the trade, and even if it
were considered part-time employment. There then would be options
available for those who truly are independent businesses or self-employed
to opt-out of regulations with accompanying standards to winnow out those
who genuinely self-employed. However, such an opt-out could not be a
condition of work on a platform. Currently such as coerced “choice” is
stuck into online EULAs, which are little more than adhesion contracts. In
these EULAs, workers have no other choice but a “take it or leave it”
bargain with an online form that many have not even read.
Currently, there are some on-demand economy companies that have
already, on their own initiative, engaged in shifting their workers to be
employee status. Take the example of Instacart, which uses a platform to
coordinate grocery delivery services. While Instacart’s business model, like
many on demand economy companies, had included classifying its workers
as independent contractors, they were taken to court in a misclassification
lawsuit.178 Rather than continue to litigate with their workers, Instacart
management instead decided to shift workers to become either full or parttime employees. Not only was this a positive development for the workers,
who received the access to benefits that employees would typically have,
but it was also advantageous for the company. Instacart management
wanted a work force that they could rely on and train. Customer
satisfaction and return business is important. If spoiled grocery items were
selected or delivered, the platform stood to lose customers. For those
platforms that are seeking quality control, a stable workforce, lower
turnover and lower recruiting costs, a change to employee status could be
substantial piece of the solution.
177
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There are other examples. HomeHero is a mobile platform that
provides home health care and elder care. They also recently shifted from
an independent contractor to an employee based model. Their CEO
claimed that they did so “in order to ensure a consistent experience as we
scale nationwide.”179 In the words of the CEO of Shyp, a package delivery
service that also moved from independent contractors to an employee
model, their “investment in longer term relationships with our couriers”
would “ultimately create the best experience for our customers.”180
Other platform companies have classified their workers as
employees from their inception. Examples of these companies include
Hello Alfred, Managed by Q, Munchery, the transit service Bridj, and the
temporary agency BlueCrew.181 The CEO of Hello Alfred noted a
commitment between the company and the workers who want more than a
gig – these workers want a career path. As many of the platform businesses
are based on people serving other people who are often repeat customers
rather than one-off transactions, it makes business sense to provide
appropriate training and career advancement to workers. Some of these
platform companies have provided benefits, including mileage and health
insurance. Their hope is to stand out from other platforms and attract the
most talented workers.
These experiences demonstrate that the platform economy can still
exist when workers are provided with the rights afforded to employees. The
concerns that burdensome regulations will drive platforms out of business
seem to be overblown, much like earlier arguments that regulation (of
minimum wage, maximum hours, child labor, safety) would end various
phases or components of the industrial revolution. To address current
misclassification issues, we come back to the thought that perhaps the best
answer is not creation of a third category with an as yet to be determined set
of rights, but instead to change the default presumptions vis-a-vis the two
categories that we already have. But businesses do need certainty, and a
safe harbor that we discuss below would surely be helpful when navigating
the uncertain question of classification.
D. Safe Harbor for Volunteerism and Alternative Business Models	
  
Many of those that have been supporting or lobbying for Uber or other
platform-based companies have suggested that these businesses deserve
179
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room to maneuver with special rules that amount to a moratorium on
existing labor regulations because they are new, interesting, and will create
more jobs in the future. What would be the justification for granting
platform economy companies such an exemption? A new business should
not be exempted from labour and employment law simply because it has
cool technology and it might create additional employment opportunities in
the future. Is there a reason that gig businesses deserve special treatment,
even better than that of non-profits, which have to pay minimum wage and
follow the other aspects of the labour and employment laws? The premise
of the argument is difficult to accept, as the platform economy is for-profit
and is comprised of workers who are plying a trade that more or less
mimics other work that is done as a full time profession for remuneration.
Some of this confusion and the calls for exemptions certainly come
from the obfuscated language that platform companies use, and the rhetoric
around their origins. The “sharing economy” began as a way for neighbors
to assist each other and to engage in more sustainable modes of production.
Rather than ownership, participants in the sharing economy were interested
in gaining access to resources that would be held in common, as shared
resources. Based on models of community volunteerism and pooled assets,
such as lending libraries and tool collections, the sharing economy sought to
reduce consumption and increase access to resources. For example, early
commercials for Lyft in the Bay Area showed neighbors assisting their
friends and neighbors without cars, making it more feasible to exist without
a car in an area that was already jammed with traffic. The sharing economy
was seen as a “green,” more sustainable choice that avoided excess
consumption.182 The idea of giving others a ride within the community and
helping out one’s neighbors was akin to volunteerism; payments were to
help out with the cost of owning and garaging a car in the Bay Area, not to
constitute a substitute for full-time employment.
Other crowdwork platforms with innovative business models
developed based on a “prosumer” idea, in which those who do work for the
platform (producers) also comprise the audience for the work (the
consumers). To take an example, on the Threadless platform, designers can
work on creating new styles for T-Shirts.183 The community will vote on
the designs to be produced, and they also then have first access to purchase
the T-shirts. The designer then profits by receiving a portion of the shirt
sales as compensation for their work.184 This type of work combined with
consumption defies many of the traditional characteristics of either
employees or independent contractors.
182
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The problem, as we noted before, is distinguishing between
authentic innovators, who could compete on a level playing field or who
have a distinct and interesting new business model, and those platforms that
are profiteers who exist “only because the current haze of legal and
regulatory uncertainty.”185 Arbitrageurs who are merely looking for legal
loopholes and to undercut traditional service providers through cheap labor
are not creating a “special” or “different” form of business that would
deserve an exemption from labour and employment law. But business
models that either are truly “sharing,” some mix of profit and non-profit (for
example, “B” corporations),186 or those that engage in prosumer
transactions, genuinely might deserve a break from labour regulations. To
the extent that the sharing economy is about green choices and involves
shared ownership and resources, there should be a “safe harbor” created if
the work looks more like volunteerism undertaken for altruistic reasons or
community-minded motivations.
There are also some instances where the provision of a service is de
minimis and thus does not merit employee status. For example, if a
businessperson used a ridesharing service once a week to pick up her
neighbor on her way into work, that businessperson should not be an
employee of Lyft. Neither are people who use Uber pool or a similar
mobile app service to set up and participate in a carpool to save fuel,
parking, and expenses. Nor are we suggesting that a person who signs up to
do a fifteen minute task on TaskRabbit once a month is an employee of the
platform. These activities seem to be de minimis or one-off casual
transactions that should not amount to an employment relationship. Trying
to sweep those extremely casual forms of work into burdensome legalities
would serve no one. Rather, we are more concerned with platforms that
seem to be competing with, or in some instances replacing, the type of fulltime employment with on-demand work.187
The concept of a threshold percentage of income or time to
determine the safe harbor seems a sensible one. At this point we are in no
place to determine exactly where to set such a threshold, but it would serve
to separate out an occasional temp or the carpooling Uber driver from those
who are working a solid number of hours on the platform. Could this look
like eight hours per week, roughly only one working day? Likewise, we do
not want to discourage neighbors or volunteers from providing their
services to others when those efforts are truly voluntary or used only to
185
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defray legitimate expenses. The safe harbor could be constituted in such a
way that it would sweep in these forms of volunteerism or altruistic work.
E.

Broader Implications

The gig economy has brought several economic and labour tensions
to the forefront: the need for managerial power and stability versus the need
for flexibility; traditional organizational dependency versus working for
multiple platforms; the choice to label as a self-employed worker versus
such “coerced” labeling in a EULA; geographic diffusion versus efforts
toward a collective voice for crowdworkers. As we wrote in the previous
section, these features define the gig-economy as a subset of a much
broader trend: the contingent, precarious, and increasingly fissured
workplace. The new standard is the so-called non-standard work. As a
consequence, we resist the notion that all will be well when we have created
a separate contractual category for gig workers. Rather, we aim to look for
solutions that will ameliorate conditions for other forms of precarious work
and for those laboring in fissured workplaces.
If we are looking for reforms that would genuinely advance the welfare of
gig workers, we could look to some suggested reforms for crowdwork. One
of the authors describes what it would take to get decent crowdwork in a
recent paper, focusing on fair wages, transparency, and due process.188 Fair
wages may be self-explanatory, but the other two categories may be less
obvious. Suffice it to say that transparency involves clear listing of
payment for work completed, as well as accurate time estimates for how
long it takes to complete the work. It also would include some disclosure of
information so that crowdworkers especially would be able to understand
what goals or projects their one small task was advancing. It would also
include sharing information about the companies that use the platform,
including information like whether they pay promptly and treat
crowdworkers fairly. Finally, due process would prevent wage theft and
allows a worker to contest or question a poor rating before it would be used
against them.189 Workers need security, and a solution could be – in a word
– “to expand the scope of labour protection beyond employment.”190
IV.
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Calls for a new “dependent contractor” hybrid category in the
United States reflexively appear attractive and an easy solution, especially
as they are touted as being tailor-made for the gig economy. That initial
reaction, however, is tempered upon further study of the content and history
of the implementation of the third category in other nations. In this paper
we have examined the hybrid worker categories in Canada, Italy, and Spain
to learn from their experiences.
In Italy, the adoption of the third category led to widespread
arbitrage of the categories, with businesses moving employees into a
“bogus” discounted status in the quasi-subordinate category. In Spain, the
requirements for attaining the third category were burdensome enough that
the third category only is applicable to a tiny number of workers. Viewed in
this light, experimenting with a third category might be seen as more risky
than just the “easy” or “obvious” solution as it first appears.
Rather than risking arbitrage of the categories, and the possibility
that some workers will actually end up losing rights, it makes sense to think
about employment status as the default rule for most gig workers, except
those that may fit into a safe harbor because they are either not working
very much (true “amateurs”) or are engaged in volunteerism for altruistic
reasons (truly “sharing”). If there is to be a third category, establishing one
that, like Canada’s “dependent contractor,” expands the scope of the
employment relationship would best meet the needs of gig workers. Such a
default rule or expanded definition makes sense whether we are thinking
about gig workers, those in fissured workplaces, franchises, or other nonstandard or contingent work arrangements. The gig economy is only the
most visible or extreme example of workplace fissuring, but they are all part
of the same larger trend.

